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I. INTRODUCTION—THE HARTFORD
IMMIGRATION COURT
A startling conclusion arose from a case decided last summer in the
United States Immigration Court at Hartford, Connecticut. In an opinion
issued June 1, 2009, after characterizing the respondent’s testimony as
candid, forthright, both internally consistent and consistent with his
written declaration and with other testimony and declarations made in
the case, Immigration Judge Michael W. Straus dismissed the case. The
Judge found that, while the respondent was sleeping in his room with his
wife and children in the early morning hours, he was awakened by a
knocking on the front door and then on the back door. When he asked
the identity of the knocker, he was informed it was the police. After
asking them who they were looking for, they said they were looking for
someone named “Chavez.” The respondent opened the door a few
inches, and without asking his permission to enter, an officer forcibly
pushed open the door. While his son translated, the respondent was
asked about his immigration status; he was later arrested.1
At the conclusion of the case, the Judge ruled that the agents’ entry
violated the respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights.2 The court
specifically addressed the “aggressive nature of the forced entry, which
required a resident to move back out of fear of being struck by the door
into a private residence at dawn.”3 Finding that the subsequent conduct
of the immigration officers “lends further support to our conclusion that
respondent has displayed the necessary aggravating circumstances”
confirming a flagrant violation of the respondent’s Fourth Amendment
rights,4 the Judge excluded the testimony and dismissed the case, a rare
result among evidentiary challenges brought in immigration courts,
where when successful, generally only remands result.
The case alerted me to the continuing issue concerning the treatment
of alleged violations of Fourth Amendment rights in immigration court,
with this article the result of research conducted relating thereto.
Beyond reviewing the relevant views of the federal courts of appeals; the
administrative tribunal that handles appeals of immigration court cases,
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA); and even local immigration
courts; I consider whether the jurisprudence has remained static since the

1.

In Removal Proceedings, at 23 (Hartford Immigr. Ct., June 1, 2009) (Straus,

2.
3.
4.

Id. at 24.
Id.
Id.

I.J.).
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Supreme Court’s watershed opinion on the issue about twenty-five years
ago. I also offer suggestions as to how to effectively, fairly, and
efficiently resolve the issues raised in the immigration context by these
Fourth Amendment cases.
Part II presents an overview of the jurisprudence governing
application of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings. Part III
visits judicial responses to violations of regulatory authority governing
detention and deportation procedures. Part IV surveys recent BIA and
immigration court interpretations of the exclusionary rule and illustrates
the difficulty of maintaining the divergent jurisprudence that currently
exists among the courts of appeals. Part V identifies issues on which
recent opinions hint at a possible turn in favor of enhanced civil rights’
protections in these cases, where “cracks”5 could be developing in the
long-standing rule disadvantaging respondents in immigration hearings.
This section then moves to suggest a unifying jurisprudence on this issue
that is more likely to result in fair and just results.
I must thank Michael J. Wishnie, Supervising Attorney at the Jerome
N. Frank Legal Services Organization at Yale Law School, and his law
student representatives, for inspiring me through their efforts, for
providing me with redacted copies of the decisions and briefs in the New
Haven case, and for convincing Judge Straus that when the government
gathers evidence against an immigrant in an unconstitutional manner, the
case must be dismissed.
II. HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN IMMIGRATION HEARINGS, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE CIRCUIT
COURTS’ RESPONSES
A. Traditional Inapplicability of Constitutional Protections
Lifted by a 1984 Supreme Court Case
The jurisprudential history of immigration law has caused any
discussion of the civil rights of immigrants to follow a non-traditional
5. Reference to “cracks” is borrowed from Steve Legomsky & Christina Rodriguez,
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 195–97 (Thomson Reuters/Foundation
Press, 5th ed. 2009). Reference to “cracks” is borrowed from Steve Legomsky & Christina
Rodriguez’s book, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY (5th ed. 2009) at 195 et.
seq.

55

SCHARF ARTICLE - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/9/2010 2:01 PM

path. While academic discussions of constitutional issues generally
begin with a review of the relevant constitutional provisions, and then
move on to a study of relevant statutory and regulatory authority
followed by discussion of applicable case law, immigration law is
different in the historically limited application of constitutional
protections to immigrants.6
6. Beginning with the case of Chae Chang Ping v. United States (“Chinese Exclusion
Case”) in 1889, the Supreme Court has established substantial jurisprudence holding
consistently, for about a century, the plenary power doctrine limited the Court’s ability to
review federal immigration legislation and that the federal government has an inherent
power to exclude non-citizens. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion
Case) 130 U.S. 581, 610-11 (1889). Nishimura Ekiu v. United States held that the Due
Process Clause does not limit this power to exclude. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142
U.S. 651, 660 (1892). The theory of these cases was applied to deportation in Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893) (requiring a white witness to attest to a
Chinese immigrant’s presence), in which the Court held that the power to exclude is inherent
in sovereignty, and that only those in the country legally are entitled to constitutional
protections.
This lack of judicial authority over immigration laws continued to be extended to
procedural due process, at least as far as those entering the country were concerned. In
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessey, 338 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1950), an exclusion
was upheld in spite of it having been carried out without a hearing, based on confidential
government information. The chilling phrase from this case, “[w]hatever procedure
authorized by Congress . . . is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned,”
is an infamous reminder of Knauff to this day.
Affirming the power of exclusion as a “fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by
the Government’s political departments” that is “largely immune from judicial control,”
the Court affirmed exclusion in Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953) that
could have resulted in the indefinite detention on Ellis Island of a non-citizen who had
no country to return to.
In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972), the Court expanded the plenary
power theory by rejecting a challenge to exclusion on the basis of substantive due
process rights, in this case those guaranteed by the First Amendment. In the case, the
Court permitted exclusion based on either advocacy or publishing pro-communist
doctrine. In Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797 (1977), this power was extended to those
who were illegitimate.
Clearly this doctrine appears inconsistent with Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178
(1803), wherein the Supreme Court asserted its power to review the constitutionality of
federal legislation. In addition, some of the Court’s earlier proclamations have been
adjusted over the years. For example, it is now clear that while Fong Yue Ting still holds
that the federal government has the constitutional power to decide upon the deportation
of even lawful immigrants, procedural due process does apply in deportation cases. As
to whether that is also true in exclusion cases, the answer is less clear.
Some rights have been acknowledged by the Supreme Court. Procedural due process
rights in deportation hearings to those already here were acknowledged in 1903 in
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903) (see discussion in Judy C. Wong, Egregious
Fourth Amendment Violations and the Use of the Exclusionary Rule in Deportation Hearings:
The Need for Substantive Equal Protection Rights for Undocumented Immigrants, 38
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 431, 437-38 (1997)).
More recently, with cases including Francis v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976) (ruling on a constitutional basis in a case involving
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On the issue of the Fourth Amendment’s application in removal7
hearings, though, the tables have turned; there actually is jurisprudence
surrounding this important issue that arises commonly in immigration
hearings. This is the result of a United States Supreme Court ruling in a
1984 case, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza,8
in which it issued an important decree on the role of the Fourth
Amendment’s9 exclusionary rule in immigration hearings.
Prior to Lopez-Mendoza, even though no case had explicitly denied
application of the Fourth Amendment in deportation proceedings, this
was long assumed to be the case by several federal courts of appeals.10
In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court held that the traditional remedy for a
Fourth Amendment violation, suppression of both illegally-seized
evidence11 and evidence that is the indirect product of illegal police
activity as “fruit of the poisonous tree,”12 was generally unavailable in
immigration court hearings, so long as the case was supported by
relief from deportation); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
959 (1983) (striking a federal statutory provision that it decided violated the principle of
separation of powers); and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 679 (2001) (striking a
provision that violated due process by permitting the government to unconditionally and
indefinitely detain a non-citizen); it has become evident by inference that the Court does
believe it has at least some authority to review certain principles of immigration law.
These cases have given rise to the notion among scholars that “cracks” have developed
in the plenary power doctrine. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 5.
7. This term refers to what is commonly referred to as “deportation;” the term
was replaced by “removal” in a 1996 statute (8 U.S.C. § 1229) making substantial
changes to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66
Stat. 163 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
8. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1033
(1984).
9. The Fourth Amendment provides the following: “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Violations of the Fourth
Amendment generally lead to the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result, hence the
term “Exclusionary Rule.”
10. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923); In re
Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 82 (B.I.A. 1979).
11. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (barring use in federal
courts of evidence seized by federal officers in violation of 4th Amendment); see also,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (barring use in state courts of evidence seized
in violation of Fourth Amendment); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960)
(barring use in federal courts of evidence seized by state officers in violation of Fourth
Amendment).
12. Wong Sun. v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
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“credible evidence derived from a peaceful arrest.”13 One of the bases
13. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051. Subsequent courts have understood LopezMendoza to stand for that proposition. See, e.g., Mendoza-Solis v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 36 F.3d 12, 14 (5th Cir. 1994). The notion that the Constitution
does not mandate the exclusionary rule to apply in civil proceedings was affirmed that
same year in Adamson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 745 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir.
1984), which cited Lopez-Mendoza. While the distinction between “civil” deportation
hearings and criminal cases may have had some rational support in the past, as a result of
changes in the law that began in the late-1980s and continued through 2001, criminal and
immigration law have become dramatically and, many say, inappropriately intertwined.
See Diana R. Podgomy, Rethinking the Increased Focus on Penal Measures in
Immigration Law as Reflected in the Expansion of the “Aggravated Felony” Concept, 99
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 287, 290 (2009); Juliet Stumpf, The CrimmigrationCrisis:
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006) (discussing the
reasons behind this merger); Teresa Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration
Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 617-18 (2003) (noting that
immigration scholars see this intersection as the importation of crimes into immigration
law, while criminal scholars view it as the imposition of the administrative and
regulatory characteristics of immigration control into the criminal justice system); Teresa
Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After
September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 122 (2005) (existence of the merger
itself); Margaret H. Taylor & Ronald F. Wright, The Sentencing Judge as Immigration
Judge, 51 EMORY L.J. 1131, 1131(2002) (describing the parallels between deportation
and punishment, and the constitutional consequences of criminalizing immigration law);
Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About
Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1893-94 (2000) (describing
the way in which deportation acts as does punishment, incapacitating the deportee,
deterring other potential offenders, and achieving retribution; suggesting that the
deportation of lawful residents, if understood to be punishment, necessitates substantive
constitutional protections, especially when applied retroactively or without counsel);
Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the PostSeptember 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 656 (2004).
“More immigration violations now constitute crimes.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)
(2006), criminalizing a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring, recruiting, or referring
for a fee an unauthorized alien for employment (§ 1324a(a)(1)(A)), or knowingly
continuing to employ an unauthorized alien (§ 1324a(a)(2); § 1325(c) (criminalizing
persons to marry for purpose of evading immigration laws); § 1325(d) (outlining
criminal penalties imposed on those who establish commercial enterprises for purpose of
evading immigration laws); § 1326(b)(1) (criminalizing noncitizens with misdemeanors
who attempt to unlawfully re-enter the United States); Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat.
3009-546-3009-724 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C and 18 U.S.C.)
(criminalizing exceeding the speed limit while fleeing an immigration checkpoint, knowingly
failing to disclose role as preparer of false immigration application, knowingly making a
false claim of U.S. citizenship, and failing to cooperate in the execution of one’s removal
order); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 1683, 1685 (2009); see
also Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 477-80 (2007) (hereafter “New
Path”) (noting that “[s]ince 1986, Congress has liberally expanded the list of
immigration offenses”); in addition, since the 1980s, prosecution of immigration-related
crimes has increased greatly, Teresa Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration
Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 639 (2003) (detailing the
increase in the number of noncitizens who face criminal punishment for crimes that were
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once only civil violations)]; see also Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants,
Crime, and Sovereign Power, supra at 388 (noting that immigration prosecutions
outnumber all other types of federal criminal prosecutions). “Immigration law has
become so tightly interwoven with criminal justice norms as to constitute a distinct legal
category.” Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, supra at 1686; Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration
Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the “War” on Terrorism?, 51
EMORY L.J. 1059, 1061-73 (2002) (describing how immigration law has become a tool of
the criminal justice system); Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and
Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1889, 1891 (2000) (noting the convergence between immigration law and criminal
justice); Legomsky, The New Path, supra at 471-73 (detailing the intersection of
criminal justice and immigration control); Miller, Citizenship and Severity, supra at 613
(describing the intimacy between the criminal justice system and immigration law as the
“criminalization of immigration law”); Miller, Blurring the Boundaries, supra at 82
(noting that commentators have alternately described the changing relationship between
criminal justice and immigration law as the “‘criminalization’ of immigration law” and
as a “convergence between the criminal justice and deportation systems”); and Stumpf,
The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, supra at 376, 384
(describing civil immigration violations that have been elevated to criminal offenses).
Another issue addressed in Lopez-Mendoza but beyond the scope of this article is
when, if at all, evidence of a non-citizen’s identity could be suppressed. One short
sentence in the case has led to much confusion: “The ‘body’ or identity of a defendant
or respondent in a criminal or civil proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an
unlawful arrest.” Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039. Despite the apparent clarity of that
statement, many cases have taken up the issue, with some finding ambiguities that have
resulted in both suppression of evidence and admission of it. Several federal circuit
courts have ruled that, despite alleged egregiousness of constitutional violations, the
identity of a defendant (emphasis supplied) is never suppressible. See, e.g., United States
v. Del Toro Gudino, 376 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004), United States v. Navarro-Diaz,
420 F.3d 581, 588 (6th Cir. 2005) (denying suppression of a defendant’s name and date
of birth when disclosed as a result of an allegedly unconstitutional detention), NavarroChalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2004). Cf., United States. v. Oscar-Torres,
507 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Despite the illegality of his detention or arrest, he
cannot suppress his person or the fact of his identity.”) (ruling that when fingerprints are
obtained by officers motivated by an investigative purpose, they are obtained by
“exploitation of police illegality” and must be suppressed, but that if this evidence was
obtained for and motivated by an administrative purpose, the evidence is admissible; the
court recognized that if a court concludes that both investigative and administrative
purposes motivated the illegal arrest and fingerprinting, the fingerprints and attendant
record evidence must be suppressed).
The Eighth Circuit, however, in United States v. Guevara-Martinez, distinguishing
criminal from deportation cases, held that Lopez-Mendoza was irrelevant to suppression
of unlawfully obtained identity-related evidence in a criminal case. United States v.
Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2001). Guevara-Martinez has been
narrowed more recently, in United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d 611, 618 (8th
Cir. 2001) and United States v. Perez-Perez, 337 F.3d 990, 994 (8th Cir. 2003). In
Guevara-Martinez, the suppressed evidence was not actually identity evidence, but
fingerprints obtained as the result of unlawful arrests. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at
754. Since then, the Eighth Circuit has indicated that, if faced with a defendant seeking
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for the ruling was the Court’s assumption that “the I.N.S. has its own
comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations by
its officers.”14 In addition, the Court indicated that the deterrent effect of
applying the exclusionary rule in civil cases, including deportation
hearings, would be minimal compared with the significant costs of
enforcing the rule.15
Regardless of both the plenary power and the Court’s conclusion on
the constitutional question in Lopez-Mendoza, the Court did leave open
the possibility for suppression of evidence in certain immigration cases.
First, the Court noted that its “conclusions concerning the exclusionary
rule’s value might change, [sic] if there developed good reason to
believe that Fourth Amendment violations by I.N.S. officers were
widespread.”16 Most important, it added that it had not dealt “with
egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might
transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative
value of the evidence obtained.”17 Clearly, the Court “implicitly
recognized that the ‘imperative’ of safe-guarding judicial integrity,

to suppress only his identity (and not fingerprints), it would not invoke the exclusionary
rule. Perez-Perez, 337 F.3d at 994.
14. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044. “I.N.S.” refers to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the legacy executive department responsible for administering
immigration laws before it was replaced, in 2003, by the Department of Homeland
Security and, within that, the newly-created Citizenship and Information Service (“CIS”).
15. Id. at 1046. Since 1923, the Court has held that deportation is a civil remedy,
thus the rights afforded criminal defendants in court need not be granted those in
deportation proceedings. Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 154. In 1979, the Board of Immigration
Appeals ruled as well in Matter of Sandoval, that the Fourth Amendment did not apply in
deportation proceedings. In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 82 (B.I.A. 1979).
16. For a creative approach to the Lopez-Mendoza limitation developed recently,
see Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in
the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza,
WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1155 (2008) (arguing that because constitutional violations are so
widespread today compared with 1984, and because immigration enforcement has changed
fundamentally since then, the assumptions that underlay the opinion in Lopez-Mendoza
have been eroded, and that, to remain faithful to the case, the exclusionary rule should be
reintroduced in immigration proceedings).
17. Earlier in the opinion the Justices discussed the array of justifications for the
exclusionary rule offered over the years, one being to deter future unlawful police conduct; it
eventually concluded that the burdens versus benefits militated against its application in
deportation hearings. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041-50. The Court pointed out
that even the BIA had agreed with this proscription. In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340,
343 (B.I.A. 1980) (holding, though, that evidence obtained by coercion or other activity
that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment may be excluded) available
at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/intdec/lib_indecitnet.html; Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at
1050-51.
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another core function of the exclusionary rule, would sometimes require
application of the rule even in the civil context.”18
It is axiomatic in constitutional law that, in a criminal case, evidence
may be suppressed if seized in contravention of a defendant’s rights
under the Fourth Amendment.19 The word “defendant” here is key, and
is behind an important impasse for many immigration scholars: the
distinction made between criminal defendants and immigration respondents.
Because of the long-held view that deportation hearings are civil in
nature,20 application of the rights granted to criminal defendants have
generally not been afforded to respondents in deportation hearings, even
though several of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights, among them both
procedural21 and substantive due process (Fifth Amendment), 22 the
rights to free speech and association (First Amendment),23 and the

18. Gonzalez-Rivera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F.3d 1441, 1448
(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Adamson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 745 F.2d 541, 545-546
(9th Cir. 1984)).
19. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 488 (1963).
20. Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 154; Trias-Hernandez v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 528 F.2d 366, 368 (9th Cir. 1975). In spite of this well-established principle,
several courts have objected: The Court in Bridges v. Wixon, for example, said that
deportation “may nevertheless visit as great a hardship as the deprivation of the right to
pursue a vocation or a calling.” 326 U.S. 135, 147, 146 (1945) (citations omitted). “Here
the liberty of an individual is at stake . . . We are dealing here with procedural requirements
prescribed for the protection of the alien. Though deportation is not technically a
criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the
right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty—at
times a most serious one—cannot be doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest the
procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of
fairness.” Id. at 154. And Justice Brandeis, speaking in Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S.
276, 284 (1922), reminded us that “deportation may result in the loss ‘of all that makes
life worth living.’”
21. Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Aslam v.
Mukasey, 537 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2008).
22. While this has been interpreted as a constitutional mandate since the mid1950s, see Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 212 (1953), claims of self-incrimination in
immigration proceedings are limited to admissions concerning actions that constitute a
crime, see Laqui v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 422 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1970).
In addition, in 1960, the Ninth Circuit Court held that “[a] coerced confession was
inadmissible a deportation hearing.” Bong Youn Choy v. Varber, 279 F.2d 642, 646 (9th
Cir. 1960).
23. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessey, 342 U.S. 580, 581 (1952); American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d on
other grounds, 940 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1991).
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right to counsel (Sixth Amendment),24 are generally provided to
immigrants.
It may not be surprising, then, that the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, rather than the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is
more frequently the successful theory upon which evidence offered at
removal hearings is excluded.25 The test applied in these cases is the
same as that used in other due process cases—whether the evidence is
both probative and fundamentally fair.26
B. Interpretations of Fourth Amendment Depend on Circuit in
Which an Immigration Court Sits
While the Supreme Court’s rule in Lopez-Mendoza still governs
removal proceedings, and has resulted in the general unavailability of
the exclusionary rule in these hearings,27 over the years since several
federal courts of appeals have tackled the question as to what the Court
meant by the phrase “egregious violations.” Accordingly, for cases
involving egregious violations of these rights as defined by the various
federal courts of appeals, these courts have begun to employ what
appears to be an “exception” to the general principle of Fourth
Amendment non-applicability outlined in Lopez-Mendoza.28 The problem

24. This right has been granted through regulation, not an interpretation based on
the Sixth Amendment, and only so long as the non-citizen pays for the attorney. In
addition, grounded in the Due Process Clause, it has been recognized as applicable to
removal cases. Waldron v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 17 F.3d 511, 517 (2nd
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014 (1994).
25. See Bustos-Torres v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 898 F.2d 1053, 1058
(5th Cir. 1990) (shifting burden to respondent to prove non-deportability once the
government has met its burden of proving deportability does not abridge Fifth Amendment
rights supports an inference that respondents do have Fifth Amendment rights in
deportation proceedings); Pinto-Montoya v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2008);
Aslam v. Mukasey, 537 F. 3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming use of video testimony);
Navia–Duran v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 568 F.2d 803, 810 (1st Cir. 1977);
In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319, 321 (B.I.A. 1980); In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340,
343 (B.I.A. 1980). A search for precedent relying exclusively on the Fifth Amendment
produced limited results beyond the two Second Circuit and the two BIA cases mentioned
herein.
26. Aslam, 537 F.3d at 114.
27. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050
(1984).
28. Others, such as the First Circuit, seem wedded to the more stringent rule. For
example, in 2006, in the case of Kandamar v. Gonzales, the Court seemed to attempt to
go further than Lopez-Mendoza when it refused to suppress the respondent’s passport
alleged to have been improperly seized by DHS in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Kandamar v. Gonzalez, 464 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2006). While the Court acknowledged that
“the seizure is troubling,” it nonetheless required, for suppression, that the respondent
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that has been caused by, first, the vague Supreme Court language, and
second, that vague language now being interpreted differently by different
courts, is apparent—a lack of uniformity in the interpretation and
implementation of an important civil right and principle of federal law.
For, depending on the location of an immigration court, immigration
judges will apply principles deriving from the circuit court in their district.
A survey of recent opinions from various courts of appeals demonstrates
this problem.
In 2006, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kandamar v. Gonzales,
acknowledged and adopted an egregiousness exception to the nonapplicability of the exclusionary rule even though it denied suppression
in concluding that the gathering of evidence against the respondent did
not involve misconduct through threats, coercion, or physical abuse.29
There is more jurisprudence in the Second Circuit. In 2006, the Court
in Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales denied suppression even though the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officer had no valid reason for
the stop or the request for identification. Nonetheless, the Court outlined
a sliding scale test to apply to the proffered evidence: a seizure suffered
for no reason would be considered an egregious violation only if it was
sufficiently severe, or if the stop was based on race or another “grossly
improper consideration.”30 In offering guidance as to what might render
a seizure gross or unreasonable, the Court mentioned both a “particularly
lengthy” initial illegal stop and the show or use of force.31
But when the Second Circuit spoke again on this issue two years later,
in a case not involving race, the Court permitted use of challenged
evidence. In Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 32 an Estonian woman who
overstayed her non-immigrant visa was questioned by U.S. Immigration
demonstrate prejudice and harmful error resulting from the seizure. Without this, the Court
refused to find that the respondent was a victim of egregious government misconduct. Id.
29. Id. at 71-72.
30. Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006). There was no
evidence in this case that race played a part in the stop. Victims of racial discrimination in
removal should also benefit by an equal protection argument in which the exclusionary
rule would apply unless the government could demonstrate at least an important state
interest for using the evidence. See Wong, supra note 6.
31. Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d at 236. In this case, although the
respondent stated in his affidavit that he was stopped based solely on his race, he offered
no evidence besides his affidavit to support his claim. When there was no evidence of
either a lengthy stop or a show of force, the court found a lack of egregious violation of
the Fourth Amendment, and did not suppress the evidence in question.
32. Melnitsenko v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2008).
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and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for several hours during a traffic stop
near the Vermont border. The Court held the facts to be insufficiently
“severe” to constitute an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Nonetheless, it emphasized that Melnitsenko was “neither arrested nor
taken to jail,”33 perhaps supporting an inference that had she been, the
case may have been decided differently. In the same year, in PintoMontoya v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit determined that while it
generally did not favor suppression, it would employ it when it found
that “an egregious violation that was fundamentally unfair had occurred,
or that the violation . . . undermined the reliability of the evidence,”34
Finally, in 2009, the Second Circuit came upon a case whose facts
induced it to suppress a statement it found to be unreliable.35 In Singh v.
Mukasey,36 the Court ruled that the immigration judge’s adverse
credibility determination of Singh was undermined and improper when
Mr. Singh, a permanent resident in removal proceedings on charges of
attempted smuggling after he and a friend attempted to re-enter the
United States at Buffalo from Canada following their visit to a strip club,
had not been advised of his rights until near the interview’s completion,
several hours into the detention; he was not informed of his rights until
after the statement was taken.37 The Court reiterated the applicability of
the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections in deportation
proceedings,38 and mentioned Lopez-Mendoza’s reluctance to sanction a
general application of the exclusionary rule in these cases. But it then
invoked Lopez-Mendoza’s failure to specify the occasions in which
exclusion is warranted because of “egregious violations of Fourth
Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental
fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained.”39
The Court took on that issue in ruling that Mr. Singh’s statement, being
unreliable, should have been suppressed.40 The Court reiterated that

33. Id. at 48. Further, the Court would not necessarily require either physical abuse or
threats of violence in order to find “severe” and therefore “egregious” violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 47. The acronym “ICE” in the prior sentence refers to the
Department of Homeland Security’s division of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
34. Pinto-Montoya v. Mukase, 540 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting AlmeidaAmaral, 461 F.3d at 235).
35. Singh v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 2009).
36. Id. at 209-11, 213.
37. Id. at 213.
38. Id. at 214-15 (citing, among others, Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147, 154
(1945)).
39. Id. at 215 (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984)).
40. Id.
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“exclusion of evidence is appropriate” ‘if . . . evidence established either
(a) that an egregious violation that was fundamentally unfair had
occurred or (b) that the violation—regardless of its egregiousness or
unfairness—undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.’”41 In
addition, it recited, from Almedia-Amaral, that “[e]ven assuming that the
conduct here was not ‘egregious,’ it nonetheless ‘undermined the
reliability of the evidence in dispute.’”42
As is usually the case, in the end, the decision turned on its facts: Mr.
Singh had been held for four to five hours in the early morning, while
armed uniformed officers were circulating; he was repeatedly told he
was going to jail, had not slept for about twenty-four hours by the time
of his release, testified that he had not read the statement he was asked to
sign, that it contained admissions he never made, that he was in custody
during this time while both his permanent resident card and his car had
been taken from him by the officers,43 “that it was unclear when he was
informed of his right to speak with an attorney or of his other rights, and
that the officer testified that she did not see Mr. Singh sign the statement
and did not witness any officer informing him of his rights until “at least
a few hours had gone by.”44 At its conclusion, the Court distinguished
this case from others in which it had affirmed denials of suppression,
noting that in those cases, the evidence was reliable, as it related to
simple objective facts, such as whether a person was a foreign citizen or
had a passport or valid visa.45 “These facts are not altered by coercive
interrogation—a person either is or is not a citizen.”46 But “[i]n this
case, the underlying issue—whether Mr. Singh knew that Mr. Bedi,
although a Canadian citizen with permission to enter the United States,
was entering the country in violation of law by virtue of his intent to
continue working in the United States without authorization—is more
nuanced and susceptible to corruption during the course of an improper
interview.”47 Given that “in this extraordinary case . . . the government

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. (citing Pinto-Montoya v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2008)).
Id. (citing Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Id.
Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 216.
Id.
Id.
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has failed to demonstrate by the requisite level of proof,” it vacated the
BIA’s order of removal and remanded the case for further proceedings.48
Did the Second Circuit alter its concept of the Fourth Amendment
between 2008 and 2009, or was it simply that the facts in the Singh case
appeared to be more egregious than were those in Melnitsenko? No one
can know.
In 2005, the Sixth Circuit failed to suppress evidence in United States
v. Navarro-Diaz,49 when questions were raised concerning the
admissibility of a defendant’s name and date of birth garnered during an
allegedly unconstitutional detention. Though denying relief, the Court
did give a nod to the egregious violation theory of Lopez-Mendoza but,
like that Court, the Sixth Circuit indicated that Navarro-Diaz was not a
victim of an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment50 given his
situation: Navarro-Diaz encountered the police not in a random attempt
to determine whether he was in the country illegally, but as the result of
his being in a hotel room in the middle of the day with four other local
men, at least one of whom was smoking marijuana. All were asked to
identify themselves, not just those who appeared Hispanic.51
Other circuits appear to be changing their approach to the issue.
While in 2001, the Eighth Circuit applied the exclusionary rule to
exclude from a removal hearing fingerprint evidence gathered as a result
of an unlawful arrest, citing Supreme Court precedent to support its
conclusion,52 the same Court, in 2005, applied the rule, this time in a
criminal case, to determine that ICE could not “take custody of a person
and fingerprint him without any admissible reason to believe the person
is an illegal alien.”53 In excluding the fingerprint evidence, the Court
stated that “such a custodial detention without justification offends the
Fourth Amendment, and therefore, the fingerprints and statements obtained
as a result of the detention must be suppressed.”54 The case involved
detention of respondent following questioning by local law enforcement
officers for undetermined reasons. When it became evident that he
primarily spoke Spanish, the officers called an agent of the U.S. Border
Patrol to interpret. During that period, the respondent allegedly admitted
that he was in the U.S. without authorization, even though there was no

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
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Id. at 217.
United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 540 F.3d 581, 585 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 587.
Id.
United States v. Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d 751, 754-57 (8th Cir. 2001).
United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 422 F.3d 711, 712 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 712.
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indication that he had received Miranda warnings prior to his statement.
After spending the night in the local jail, he was transported to the ICE
office, still in custody. When his fingerprints were scanned and it was
learned that he had previously been deported, he was indicted for reentry following deportation.55 The Court ruled that the detention had
been unconstitutional, thus finding that the evidence should be excluded,
as it was “obtained by exploitation of [an unlawful detention] instead of
by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.”56
To the government’s assertion that the detention was constitutional
because the respondent admitted to being in the U.S. illegally, thereby
providing ICE a basis for detention, the Court disagreed,57 as there
was no indication that the respondent had been given Miranda warnings
before making the inculpatory statements and the government offered
nothing to support its claim that ICE had reason to believe he was in the
U.S. illegally based on anything other than his own statement to the
Border Patrol. “Because the government was able to demonstrate no
constitutional justification for detaining Flores-Sandoval,” the Court
said, “the District Court did not err in granting his motion to suppress his
fingerprint evidence and statements.”58 Holding that “statements that
result from an illegal detention are not admissible,”59 the Court noted
that the government failed to show that respondent’s statement was
made in circumstances that make its use permissible, as the government,
here acting through the Border Patrol, offered no evidence to justify
detaining respondent in the first place.60 While the Court was well
55. Id. at 713.
56. Id. at 714 (citing Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 755).
57. Id. (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 384 F.3d 562, 565 (8th
Cir. 2004)).
58. Id. at 715. The Court noted that after disposition of this appeal, ICE could issue a
detainer on respondent to retake custody because as a jurisdictional rather than an evidentiary
matter, his body and identity could not be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree (citing
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1984)). The
Court opined that this would happen as a result of civil deportation proceedings, so while
their decision was of limited value to Flores-Sandoval, the Court applied well-established
Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent and reached “a result that has a somewhat
academic feel to it. Yet we believe there is value in reminding the government that it
must do things ‘the right way.’ Our holding today serves that important interest.” Id. (citing
Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 753, 756).
59. Id. at 714 (citing United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 384 F.3d 562, 565 (8th
Cir. 2004)).
60. Id. at 714-15. The court also held that its outcome should be the same as it was
in United States v. Guevara-Martinez, which held that fingerprint evidence is subject to the
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aware of the fact that, subsequent to the disposition of the appeal, ICE
would likely issue a detainer to retake the respondent’s custody,61 “[a]s
a practical matter, our decision is of very limited value to FloresSandoval. The decision simply applies well-established Supreme Court
and Eighth Circuit precedent and admittedly reaches a result that has a
somewhat academic feel to it. Yet we believe there is value in reminding
the government that it must do things ‘the right way.’ Our holding today
serves that important interest.”62
In the Ninth Circuit, as in the others, while the Court has been more
likely to find the egregiousness to which it believed Lopez-Mendoza
referred in cases involving immigration-related stops made based on the
respondent’s race, its views of egregiousness in other scenarios were
generally limited until recently. In 1985, a year following LopezMendoza, in a case that did not involve race, the Court reflected the
Supreme Court’s view of the Fourth Amendment and deportation
proceedings when it stated that “the exclusionary rule is inapplicable in
civil deportation proceedings in the absence of any showing that the
officer’s conduct would undermine the credibility of the challenged
evidence.”63 Here was evident the Court’s view that excluding evidence
would be the exception to the rule. Further, as to egregiousness, the
Court offered a particularly limited view, requiring evidence that officers’
actions “undermined the probative value of petitioner’s statements” by
causing the statements to have been made involuntarily or as the result
of duress or coercion.64 By 1994, when the Court suppressed evidence
gathered as a result of a stop it determined had been based solely on the
respondent’s Hispanic appearance,65 it held that egregiousness was proved,
as the stop was made in bad faith and constituted an egregious violation
of the Fourth Amendment.
As the years progressed, the Ninth Circuit developed a broader view
of excludability. For example, by 2008, the Court began ordering the
exclusionary rule and thus, given that evidence did not support an assumption that the
respondent consented to the taking of his fingerprints. Id. at 715 (citing Guevara-Martinez,
262 F.3d at 755-57). Also, the fingerprints were taken during a custodial detention by
ICE that has not been constitutionally justified. Id. at 715.
61. This is because, “as a jurisdictional rather than an evidentiary matter, his body
and identity cannot be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. (citing GuevaraMartinez, 262 F.3d at 756).
62. Id. (quoting Guevara-Martinez, 262 F.3d at 756).
63. Cervantes-Cuevas v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 797 F.2d 707, 711
(9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis supplied).
64. Id.
65. Gonzalez-Rivera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir.
1994).
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exclusion of any evidence obtained either as the result of a deliberate
violation of the Fourth Amendment or as the result of conduct that a
reasonable officer should have known violated the Constitution.66 The
Board of Immigration Appeals understands that the Ninth Circuit’s view
of the exclusionary rule is broader than the standard adopted by both the
BIA67 and the First and Second Circuits.68
To summarize, while it is difficult to identify a unified test that is
applied to determine whether evidence being offered against a noncitizen at a removal hearing should be excluded, to date, there is no case
law that helps determine either the precise quantum or quality of evidence
the government must proffer to justify evidentiary admission in a removal
case.69 Nonetheless, based on the assumption that the evidence should at
least meet the level required of respondents to meet their prima facie
case, Matter of Barcenas instructs us that the government must make
reasonable attempts to produce supporting testimony from agents with
knowledge of the events.70 While this requirement furthers the general
principles of fundamental fairness and reflects that due process is afforded
to those in removal proceedings,71 the relevant regulations, requiring an
immigration judge to receive into evidence “any oral or written statement
that is material and relevant to any issue in the case,”72 arguably imply a
lower standard of proof for admissibility. Nonetheless, the regulation is
tempered by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which mandates

66. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en
banc denied sub nom. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098, 1099 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing Adamson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 745 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 1984)); see
Orhorhaghe v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 38 F.3d 488, 504 (9th Cir. 1994)
(affirming the Immigration Judge’s suppression of a passport and Form I-94 seized in an
egregious violation of constitutional rights involving both a race-based stop and invasive
search techniques).
67. This rule was adopted in In re Cervantes-Torres, 21 I. & N. Dec. 351, 353
(B.I.A. 1996).
68. The First Circuit’s test was described in Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65,
71-72 (2006) (denying a motion to suppress and concluding that “egregious” misconduct
by government agents was that which involves threats, coercion, or physical abuse); the
Second Circuit’s test was explained in Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d at 236
(denying motion to suppress fruits of illegal stop during which respondent was asked for
identification; a seizure was egregious if it is grossly unreasonable or “sufficiently severe”).
69. See In Removal Proceedings, supra note 1, at *12.
70. In re Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609, 611 (B.I.A 1988).
71. See United States v. Barraza-Leon, 575 F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir. 1978); Singh v.
Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207, 214 (2d Cir. 2009).
72. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7(a) (2010).
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that a non-citizen in removal proceedings “shall have a reasonable
opportunity to examine the evidence against [him/her] . . . and to crossexamine witnesses presented by the Government.”73 Thus, an immigration
judge’s admission of unsupported evidence may constitute a due process
violation if its inclusion prejudices the respondent.74
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO REGULATORY VIOLATIONS GOVERNING
DETENTION AND DEPORTATION PROCEDURES
Given that courts have hesitated to invoke the Constitution to regulate
evidence introduced at immigration hearings, relying instead, as did the
Court in Lopez-Mendoza, on the assumption that the regulations
pertinent to collecting evidence will be honored, it should be instructive
to review the value of that reliance. Various regulations promulgated
pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) govern the role
of arresting officers, warrants, and other details concerning apprehension
and detention of suspected immigration law violators. For example,
while INA § 287(a)(2) allows authorized officers to arrest without
warrant “any alien in the United States, if he has reason to believe that
the alien, so arrested is in the United States, in violation of any such law
or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for
his arrest;” 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(1) specifies that “[o]nly designated
immigration officers are authorized to make an arrest.” Further, 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.8(c)(2)(i) requires that “[a]n arrest shall only be made when the
designated immigration officer has reason to believe that the person
arrested has committed an offense against the United States or is an alien
illegally in the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(ii) sets out details
as to when a warrant is required: “A warrant of arrest shall be obtained
except when the designated immigration officer has reason to believe
that the person is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.”
Finally, 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(iii) requires an officer to identify himself
or herself as an immigration officer authorized to make an arrest, and to
state that the person is under arrest and the reason for the arrest.
While it is true that not all regulatory violations in the immigration
arena are held to be grounds to dismiss related removal charges,75 some
73. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 240(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)
(4)(B) (2006).
74. See Farrokhi v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 900 F. 2d 697, 702 (4th
Cir. 1990) (finding a due process violation based on lack of counsel); see also Marku v.
Board of Immigration Appeals, No. 03-40871, 2005 WL 1162978, at *1 (2d Cir. May
16, 2005).
75. See Lin v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 459 F.3d 255, 267-72 (2d Cir. 2006).
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courts have considered such violations, especially when occasioned by
arresting officers, to warrant dismissal.76 An early and poignant statement
on this question worth recalling here was issued by the Supreme Court in
1945, when it held in Bridges v. Wixon that a violation of an immigration
regulation intended to protect noncitizens from unfair procedures in
deportation proceedings should result in a dismissal in a case involving
improperly introduced hearsay on the key issue in the case. The Court
emphasized the crucial importance of making correct deportation decisions
when it said:
Here the liberty of an individual is at stake. Highly incriminating statements are
used against him—statements which were unsworn and which under the governing
regulation are inadmissible. We are dealing here with procedural requirements
prescribed for the protection of the alien. Though deportation is not technically
a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives
him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation
is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted. Meticulous care
must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not
meet the essential standards of fairness.77

Nearly ten years later, in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,78
the Supreme Court held more broadly that an administrative agency
must adhere to its own regulations. This principle neither died with
Bridges nor was limited to the particular procedural objections of that
case. Rather, it remains alive today, and is evident in the 1977 First
Circuit case of Navia-Duran v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,79
which vacated a deportation order because of noncompliance with a
regulation requiring that statements used as evidence must be in writing
and under oath, and that the respondent’s signature be requested. That
Court indicated that the case reminded us that the I.N.S.-established
procedures should be followed at deportation hearings,80 and that these
procedures are supported by regulations found in the Code of Federal

In Lin, the court did reverse the BIA’s order of removal in a Chinese asylum case after a
violation of a regulation that prohibited disclosure of confidential information that put
the petitioner at risk of persecution if returned to China.
76. See Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (deportation based on union organizer’s
alleged membership in the Communist Party).
77. Id. at 154.
78. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954).
79. Navia-Duran v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 568 F.2d 803, 808 (1st Cir.
1977).
80. This can be found at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970).

71

SCHARF ARTICLE - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

12/9/2010 2:01 PM

Regulations.81 The Court quoted the statement from Bridges v. Wixon
cited above, and reiterated its belief that compliance with regulations is
an essential safeguard of a non-citizen’s right to due process,82 a rule that
“evolved in the context of civil, not criminal, proceedings.”83
The analogies to both Bridges and Accardi were evident to the court
ruling on Navia-Duran, particularly when it highlighted the principle,
affirmed by the regulation,84 that one “arrested without a warrant . . .
must be advised of his right to legal representation at a deportation hearing
and of the possible use of his statement in a subsequent proceeding.”85
“Expulsion,” the Court said, “cannot turn upon utterances cudgeled from
the alien by governmental authorities; statements made by the alien and
used to achieve his deportation must be voluntarily given.”86
Finally, the court indicated its agreement that the “old Supreme Court
dictum [from Bilokumsky to Tod, that the rule against involuntary
confessions should not apply in deportation proceedings] has been
undercut by later cases which recognize that the rule against involuntary
confessions is an essential element of due process.”87
Other circuits have been equally deferential to the axiom that enacted
regulations must be followed, especially in removal hearings where
respondents do not benefit by the full panoply of rights accorded
criminal defendants. Nearly forty years after Accardi, in 1991, the
Second Circuit adopted its doctrine in Montilla v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, when it held that “[t]he failure of the [BIA] and
of the Department of Justice to follow their own established procedures
[constituted] reversible error.”88 So, while the respondent in the 1993
Second Circuit case of Waldron v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service was unsuccessful in challenging the refusal to allow him to
contact his own consulate, the court nonetheless established that
Waldron would have succeeded had he proved either that the applicable
regulation been “promulgated to protect a fundamental right derived

81. In this case, the regulations are found at 8 C.F.R. § 242 (1977).
82. Navia-Duran, 568 F.2d at 809.
83. Id. (citing Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1969)).
84. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (2010).
85. Navia-Duran, 568 F.2d at 809.
86. Id. at 810. It is true that in United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, the Supreme
Court stated that an essential element of due process must be absent in order to render a
deportation hearing unfair. 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923).
87. Navia-Duran, 568 F.2d at 811. The Court also cited Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227, 240-41 (1940).
88. Montilla v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 926 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991).
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from the Constitution or federal statute,” or that he had suffered
prejudice to the rights sought to be protected by the regulation.89
IV. THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. Analysis of Past Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions
At the outset, a little background should be helpful for those
unfamiliar with the administrative review tribunal for immigration cases.
The Board of Immigration Appeals, commonly known as the BIA, has a
heavy caseload; in fiscal year 2003, for example, it decided over 44,000
appeals.90 Of those cases, more than 12,000 reached the federal circuit
courts of appeals.91 Unfortunately, the BIA publishes only a few of its
decisions, selected by a majority of the Board members to have precedential
value.92 Most of its decisions remain unpublished and while they used to
be accompanied by short explanations, since 1999, they have also included
“affirmances without opinion,” known commonly as “AWOs,” terse
decisions without any reasoning.93 Thus, it is difficult to view these
cases as an entity in order to ascertain the BIA’s views on particular issues.
89. Waldron v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1014 (1994).
90. Edward R. Grant, Laws of Intended Consequences: IIRAIRA and Other Unsung
Contributors to the Current State of Immigration Litigation, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 923, 925
(2006).
91. Id.
92. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2010); see also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID
A. MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY
251-55 (West, 5th ed. 2003); 1 Charles Gordon, Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.24[2][c] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2010).
93. See John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, & Elizabeth Cronin, Why are
So Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An
Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1,
18-19 (2005); see also Katie R. Eyer Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law,
60 ADMIN. L. REV. 647, 676-77 (Summer 2008) (“[T]he number of precedential decisions
issued by the Board . . . decreased dramatically in the years following 1999. In FY 1999,
just prior to the issuance of the first set of streamlining regulations, the BIA issued forty
five precedential decisions, a number fairly consistent with its historical practice. During
the following three years, the number of precedential decisions issued each year fell to
the mid-twenties. In FY 2003, 2004, and 2005, following the issuance of the 2002
streamlining regulations, the number of precedential decisions fell even further, with an
all-time low number . . . five–being issued in 2004 . . . considered as a proportion of the total
number of cases decided by the BIA. . . . [Prior to the streamlining,] approximately 0.256%
of BIA appeals resulted in published precedential decisions[,] . . . [while] following the
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Having said that, for the past nearly thirty years, the Board has, at least
in its precedent cases,94 followed the federal courts of appeals’ rulings on
the Fourth Amendment and the issue of egregiousness and has held that
evidence obtained as a result of violations of the Fourth Amendment
may constitute violations of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
and is thus suppressible if that evidence would adversely affect the
fundamental fairness of an immigration proceeding.95 In spite of that
holding, the occasions on which the BIA has ruled that evidence should
be suppressed have been notably few in number. For example, the Index
to BIA Precedent Decisions Volume 22 categorizes decisions involving
the exclusionary rule under the general topic “Evidence.” While this
volume includes Interim Decisions 2526-3540, covering BIA precedent
cases from 1976–2009, only six of these cases concerned the applicability
of the exclusionary rule. Of those six cases, in only two, Matter of Garcia
and Matter of Toro,96 do we find the BIA discussing the exclusionary
rule in light of either the Fourth or Fifth Amendment considerations.97
Historically, the BIA has been even less concerned with regulatory
violations, adopting the restrictive “prejudice” test in 1980 when deciding
whether deportation proceedings should be invalidated following a
regulatory violation.98 In that year, it found substantial compliance with

1999 and 2002 streamlining regulations, . . . 0.066% of BIA appeals result[ed] in published
precedential decisions in 2001 and a mere 0.010% [in 2004].”).
94. Three-member panels decide precedential cases. See BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
PRACTICE MANUAL, ch. 1.3(a)(i) (rev. Apr. 1, 2008), available at http:// www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/bia/qapracmanual/apptmtn4.htm (“[A] single Board Member decides cases unless
the case falls into one of six categories that require a decision by a panel of three Board
Members [such as] the need to establish a precedent construing the meaning of laws,
regulations or procedures.”). Moreover, only “selected decisions of the Board rendered
by a three-member panel or by the Board en banc may be designated to serve as
precedents.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2010). Further, “[u]npublished decisions are binding on
the parties to the decision but are not considered precedent for unrelated cases.” BOARD
OF IMMIGRATION PRACTICE MANUAL, ch. 1.4(d)(ii) (rev. Apr. 1, 2008). Because unpublished
decisions lack precedential value, courts have declined to give them deferential treatment
under Chevron. See Chan v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 1997) (refusing to
defer to an unpublished disposition that, “by the INS’s own regulations . . . carr[ies] no
precedential weight”). However, there is disagreement on this issue. See Garcia-Quintero v.
Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1011-14 (9th Cir. 2006) (denying Chevron deference to a nonprecedential BIA decision but emphasizing that Chevron deference may apply where the
non-precedential decision relied on and was “compelled by” an earlier precedential decision).
95. In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (B.I.A. 1980).
96. Id.; In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319 (B.I.A. 1980).
97. In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 319; In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 343.
98. In re Garcia-Flores, 17 I. &. N. Dec. 325, 329 (B.I.A. 1980) (“[W]here agency
action has been invalidated by the Supreme Court there has either been an expressed or clearly
apparent prejudice to the individual as a result of a violation of a rule or regulation
promulgated at least in part to bestow a procedural or substantive benefit on the individual in
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a regulation requiring that respondents be informed that statements made
could be used in subsequent proceedings, where the record did not reflect
that the respondent was so advised, but where the forms respondent
signed advised him, “in both English and Spanish, of his right to consult
a lawyer and his right to ask for a hearing to determine his right to remain in
the United States.”99 In 1991 the prejudice standard was disavowed after
the Second Circuit held that relief for a non-citizen claiming the I.N.S.
had failed to adhere to its own regulations in a deportation hearing was
not predicated on proof of prejudice; rather, all that need be shown was
that the I.N.S. violated regulations intended for the applicant’s benefit.100
The paucity of precedential BIA cases undoubtedly hampers research
into the suppression issue. 101 Further, the federal courts of appeals’
continuing divergence as to what constitutes egregious conduct by
government agents vis-à-vis immigration detainees has seemingly proved
a challenge for the BIA as well, which finds itself applying different
tests in different cases, depending on the law of the circuit in which the
case originated. For example, in the recent case of Matter of SanchezLopez arising in the Ninth Circuit (though an unpublished case), the BIA
applied that Circuit’s egregious violation rule, which is broader than that
of the First or Second Circuit.102

question. Where compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Constitution, prejudice
may be presumed. Similarly, where an entire procedural framework, designed to insure the
fair processing of an action affecting an individual is created but then not followed by an
agency, it can be deemed prejudicial (citations omitted). As a general rule, however,
prejudice will have to be specifically demonstrated.”).
99. In re Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I. & N. Dec. 503, 506 (B.I.A. 1980).
100. Montilla v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 926 F.2d 162, 169 (2d Cir.
1991). It could be argued that Montilla only meant to disavow the ‘prejudice’ in cases
involving alleged violations of regulations regarding the right to counsel in immigration
hearings. See, e.g., id.
101. A conversation with the BIA Library staff in Falls Church, Virginia confirmed
that statistics are not generated by the BIA comparing the number of published cases
with the total number decided. A staff member indicated that the current volume of the
BIA’s indexed decisions, volume 24, includes decisions from 2009 through the present
(mid-March 2010), during which time only 32 decisions have been deemed to
carry precedential value. Some scholarly works attempt to get at these baseline figures.
See, e.g., John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So
Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court?
An Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
1 (2005).
102. In re Sanchez-Lopez, No. A094-810-418, (B.I.A. May 7, 2009), available at
www.bibdaily.com (search Sanchez-Lopez).
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In a manner similar to the federal courts of appeals, in the years since
Lopez-Mendoza, the BIA has relied not upon the Fourth Amendment,
but upon the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause when it encountered
challenged evidence that lacked both probative value and fundamental
fairness.103 In fact, in 1979, it terminated proceedings after finding that a
respondent’s admissions, which formed the basis for the government’s
case, were based on coerced and involuntary statements, thereby violating
due process.104 In light of that decision, when a different respondent lost
an appeal on the grounds of allegedly tainted evidence the following
year, the BIA did reaffirm that “circumstances surrounding an arrest and
interrogation . . . may in some cases render evidence inadmissible under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”105
As to the Fourth Amendment, the 1979 case of Matter of Sandoval
confirmed the BIA’s canon that the exclusionary rule did not apply in
deportation proceedings.106 A year later it reaffirmed this conclusion, in
a statement eerily akin to Lopez-Mendoza in its first blush denial of the
Fourth Amendment, when the BIA iterated that “evidence resulting from
a search and seizure in violation of Fourth Amendment rights is not . . .
excludable from civil deportation proceedings.”107 In Matter of Toro,
the BIA actually found that the officers’ conduct during the arrest and
interrogation breached the respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights; in
affirming the deportation, the Tribunal reasoned that the procedures
employed were not prohibited at the time in which they were engaged,
as the incident had taken place nearly a year before the Supreme Court
ruled them to be unconstitutional.108
It was not until 1996 that the BIA specifically acknowledged the
Lopez-Mendoza mandate that evidence produced at deportation hearings
103. Trias Trias-Hernandez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 528 F.2d 366,
369 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (B.I.A. 1980).
104. In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319, 320-21 (B.I.A. 1980) (finding that admission
of alienage was made only after officers led respondent to believe he was going to be
deported, that he had no rights, including none to speak with counsel, and that he could
be detained without explanation).
105. In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 343 (citing In re Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 319).
106. In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70, 77 (B.I.A. 1979). There is an odd statement
appearing as dictum in Sandoval to the effect that respondent’s admission at the hearing
concerning her alienage was elicited from her after she was improperly not informed of
her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. As a result, the admission was
disregarded. Id. at 72. The appropriate inference drawn here is that the court assumed this
privilege to be applicable in deportation proceedings, regardless of whether the statement
would have subjected the respondent to criminal liability.
107. In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec., at 343 (citing In re Sandoval, 17 I. & N. Dec. 70
(B.I.A. 1979)).
108. Id. at 343-44 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975)).
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which derived from egregious violations of Fourth Amendment rights
must be excluded.109
Because it is difficult to draw supportable conclusions as to the BIA’s
jurisprudence from so few cases, I conducted additional research into the
BIA’s opinions on this topic, which led to cases the BIA chose not to
assign precedential value. At the risk of discipline for citing and discussing
unpublished cases,110 I will do just that; otherwise, my attempt to draw
conclusions about the BIA’s views on this issue would be fruitless.111
In one non-precedential case from May 2009, the BIA affirmed the
termination of removal proceedings where, following an illegal search
and seizure, detention, and interrogation by immigration agents, the
respondent admitted alienage.112 In that case, originating in California
and thus controlled by the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence on the issues of
egregiousness,113 there was first an illegal stop; next when the respondent
was subjected to a pat search, agents found respondent’s wallet, which
produced evidence of alienage; subsequently, during respondent’s detention
and interrogation, he admitted his alienage. The court reasoned that,
under the Ninth Circuit’s rule (being broader than that of the BIA), the
evidence recovered during the pat search needed to be excluded because
“a reasonable officer should have known that a pat search of the respondent
and the act of reaching into the respondent’s pocket and removing his
identification card from his wallet, [sic] would be a violation of the
respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights.”114
More recently, in October 2009, operating on the theory that “egregious
violations of Fourth Amendment rights that transgress notions of

109. In re Cervantes-Torres, 21 I. & N. Dec. 351, 353 (B.I.A. 1996) (denying relief,
as the voluntary admissions were not the result of the illegal arrest).
110. In one case the court actually raised the possibility of discipline for a lawyer who
cited to an unpublished case. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
111. This lack of a stock of precedential cases discourages effective client counseling
and almost assures a level of law practice far below that which ethical, diligent attorneys
strive for and are expected to attain.
112. In re Sanchez-Lopez, No. A094-810-418, (B.I.A. May 7, 2009), available at
www.bibdaily.com (search Sanchez-Lopez).
113. Requiring exclusion of any evidence obtained as the result of a deliberate
violation of the Fourth Amendment or as the result of conduct that a reasonable officer
should have known violates the Constitution. In this case the BIA agreed with the IJ that
a reasonable officer should have known that a pat search of the respondent and reaching
into the respondent’s pocket and removing his identification card from his wallet would
be a violation of the respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 2.
114. Id.
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fundamental fairness” warrant application of the exclusionary rule in
immigration proceedings, the BIA issued another unpublished opinion in
the removal case of Roberto Cervantes-Valerio.115 Though not dismissing,
the BIA did remand when the respondents challenged the judge’s refusal
to hold a hearing on their Motion to Suppress the Form I-213,116 where
respondents alleged that the information contained therein regarding
identity and alienage was improperly obtained by officials who lacked a
“reasonable suspicion” sufficient to support a lawful apprehension.117
The BIA noted that the judge’s ruling denying the motion failed to address
whether the admission of the documents was fundamentally fair, whether
the respondents had been lawfully stopped, or whether respondents had
established the existence of an egregious violation of the Fourth
Amendment. In its ruling, the BIA, citing Lopez-Mendoza, Matter of
Sandoval, and more recent decisions such as Navarro-Diaz118 and
Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales,119 reiterated that a seizure is egregious if it
is “gross or unreasonable” or “sufficiently severe,” the standard of the
Second Circuit.
Further, the BIA seemed determined to remind the immigration judges
that procedural requirements applicable in removal hearings should not
be ignored: first, removal hearings must be conducted in accordance
with requirements specified in the relevant Code of Federal Regulations,
requiring that when there are contested issues of removability, the IJ
“shall receive evidence as to any unresolved issues”;120 and second, the
INA121 mandates that respondents have a reasonable opportunity to
examine the evidence against them, to present evidence on their own
behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses presented by the DHS.122 The

115. In re Cervantes-Valerio, at *2 (B.I.A. Oct. 2, 2009), available at www.
bibdaily.com (search Cervantes-Valerio).
116. Record of Deportable Alien. The I-213 is the form created by the legacy I.N.S.
officer or the ICE officer with biographical information about a noncitizen as well as
information obtained through undercover investigations, other law enforcement agencies,
the USCIS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and other agencies. It is generally
created during the questioning of a noncitizen to obtain information to place him in removal
proceedings. See 1 NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW & DEFENSE § 7.5 (West,
3d ed. 2009).
117. In re Cervantes-Valerio, supra note 115, at *1.
118. United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 2005).
119. Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir. 2006).
120. The Court here cited 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(d) (2010).
121. Immigration and Nationality Act, 36 I.N.A. § 240(b)(4)(B) (2010).
122. For recent commentary on the critiques leveled against the fairness of hearings
before both the BIA and the immigration courts, see Lindsey R. Vaala, Bias on the Bench:
Raising the Bar for U.S. Immigration Judges to Ensure Equality for Asylum Seekers, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011 (2007); Grant, supra note 90, at 954.
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BIA specified in Cervantes-Valerio’s remanded hearing that these
requirements were to be followed.123
As a way to further discern the BIA’s position on the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments and suppression of tainted evidence, I reviewed all published
BIA cases from 2006–2009 and studied the six in which Motions to
Suppress were filed. The BIA affirmed the judges’ denials of Motions
to Suppress in four cases, and in only two of the six did the BIA alter the
judges’ decisions. One resulted in a remand, the other in a dismissal of
the removal proceedings. One surely turned on a race-based stop, and
the other probably did as well.
In the case involving the remand, it appears that the facts may have
made out a case for an egregious violation of Fourth Amendment rights
based on unlawful race discrimination, an inference impossible to
confirm, as the immigration judge failed to specify sufficient details to
make the inference.124 In the case, the respondent claimed he was arrested
solely because he was speaking Spanish and because he was Hispanic.125
The BIA appeared to agree with the respondent that the Form I-213
indicated that the stop was solely based on the respondent’s Hispanic
appearance and thus could be found to have been egregious. In addition,
there was apparently no independent evidence offered to establish the
respondent’s removability other than the fruit of the unlawful arrest.
In the case involving dismissal, the DHS had appealed the immigration
judge’s ruling terminating proceedings; the BIA dismissed the appeal
and affirmed the termination.126 At the removal hearing, because the judge
found that respondent’s arrest had been egregious and a violation of the
Fourth Amendment, he suppressed the evidence obtained as a result
thereof. The BIA agreed with the immigration judge that the respondent
was neither asked about his immigration status before he was arrested
nor arrested for safety concerns; rather, his arrest was based solely on his
Hispanic appearance and his limited English, constituting an egregious
violation of the Fourth Amendment that warranted suppression of the
evidence gathered as a result of the unlawful activity.127

123. In re Cervantes-Valerio, supra note 115, at *3.
124. In re Guerrero-Renovato, 2009 WL 2171592 (B.I.A. July 8, 2009).
125. Id. at *2.
126. In re Avalos-Casillas, 2008 WL 4722664 (B.I.A. Oct. 7, 2008).
127. Id. at *2 (citing Gonzalez-Rivera v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 22 F.3d
1441, 1449-52 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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B. Coming Full Circle: Immigration Courts on the Front Line—
The Boston Immigration Court
In the fact that the BIA speaks through the local immigration court
judges as well as with its own voice, it is instructive to revisit how
immigration judges are handling Fourth Amendment issues. While I
have been unable to identify all of the Fourth Amendment-related opinions
of the sitting immigration judges around the nation, there is at least one
other case besides that of the Hartford Immigration Court Judge described
earlier in this article in which objections to evidence offered by the
government resulted in a dismissal of the removal charges. In this 2009
case decided by the Boston Immigration Court, Immigration Judge
Leonard A. Shapiro found violations of 8 C.F.R. § 287 and of both the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, excluded the evidence garnered from an
illegal search and, ultimately, dismissal of the case because of a dearth
of evidence.128
In fact, in that case, the judge actually found that the government
agents’ activity to have been unconstitutional.129 Procedurally, the judge
initially found that the respondent had met her burden of establishing a
prima facie case for suppression,”130 in that documentary evidence was
not shown to have been obtained “independent of, and prior to “a
warrantless search and arrest.”131 In his finding, Judge Shapiro, while
acknowledging that “the exclusionary rule does not generally apply in
removal proceedings,132 nonetheless noted the appropriateness of applying
it to suppress evidence acquired in violation of the Fourth Amendment
where the violation was egregious.133 In this particular case, that is
precisely what he found.

128. In Removal Proceedings (Bos. Immigr. Ct., Aug. 25, 2009) (Shapiro, I.J.).
129. More than one regulation was violated. First, 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(f)(2), which
requires consent of owners or occupants of a residence before immigration officers enter
without a warrant. The next regulation required that that unless one is likely to escape before
a warrant can be issued, immigration officers must obtain an arrest warrant. 8 C.F.R. §
287.8(c)(2)(ii). The Judge noted that “[t]hese regulations are mandated by the Constitution,
and a violation implicates constitutional rights.” Id. at *10.
130. In re Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609, 611 (B.I.A 1988).
131. In Removal Proceedings, supra note 128, at *8, (citing Murray v. United States,
487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988)).
132. Id. at *5 (citing Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. 1032, 1051 (1984)).
133. Id. at *5 (citing Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51 & Navarro-Chalan v.
Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that Lopez-Mendoza “left the door
open [for application of the exclusionary rule] in cases of egregious violations of Fourth
Amendment or other liberties.”)).
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The facts of the case are instructive. It began with a warrantless
search of a third floor apartment in Newburyport, Massachusetts at 4:10
a.m. on August 23, 2007.134 Testimony showed that respondent, who
shared the apartment with her fiancé and four others, “awoke suddenly
to someone pounding on her bedroom door.” They became “confused
and did not understand who it could be or why someone would punch
their bedroom door in the middle of the night. They thought it might be
the fire department.” Respondent “turned the key to unlock the door.”
As she did this, “two men pushed the door open and entered the bedroom.
The lights were off, and everything was dark. The men shined a flashlight
in their faces and told them [both of whom were naked] not to speak.”
One “tried to grab a towel to give to [respondent], but the men said,
‘don’t get anything’ and get out of here.” Respondent’s fiancé “grabbed
his shorts and [respondent] had to get out of bed, completely naked, in
front of the men. She grabbed her pajamas at the end of the bed and put
them on.” The men took respondent and her fiancé “to the living room
and told them to sit on the couch. The officers did not indicate who they
were, did not show [respondent] . . . any documents or papers, and did not
tell them where they were going, and [respondent] did not know who
they were or that they were immigration officers. Their uniforms had
“ICE” printed on them. A female officer asked [respondent] for her
passport, and [respondent] told her that it was in their bedroom, but she
could not recall where. As soon as she said where her passport was,
another officer went to [respondent’s] room to look for it . . . She did not
feel that she could get up and leave because they were intimidating her
and making her scared. [Respondent] requested to use the restroom, and
the female officer went with her and stayed with her in the bathroom
until she was finished.” Before respondent and her fiancé “were taken to
Boston, the officers placed them in handcuffs. From Boston to the
detention facility, restraints were also placed on [respondent’s] ankles.
Once in Boston, the officers locked [respondent] in one of the cells,
separated from the others. No one told her what was going on. After
a while, someone came with papers for [respondent] to sign. [Respondent]
did not know what the papers meant, and she was afraid. She did not sign
the papers . . . After [respondent] was released after paying bond,
[respondent] returned to her apartment and, once there, took pictures of

134.

Id. at *2.
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the apartment, which was “messy and disorganized, . . . different than its
condition before the incident occurred.”135 “[Respondent] testified that one
of the photographs was of her bedroom. The picture showed a dresser
with various drawers missing. [Respondent] testified that she did not
take the drawers out, and they had not been like that before she left the
apartment on August 23 . . . The officers seized her passport and have
not returned it.”136
In his opinion following this description, Judge Shapiro stated that
even though regulations governing immigration arrests had been violated
in this case, these violations alone would not have warranted suppression
of the evidence obtained therefrom.137 Nonetheless, he dismissed the
case upon finding, in addition, that the regulatory violations implicated
constitutional rights, maintaining that “to admit any evidence derived
from those violations would compromise the fundamental fairness of the
removal proceedings.”138
Therefore, there is consistency in the BIA’s approach to Fourth
Amendment claims: it applies the law of the federal courts of appeals
from which cases arise, encountering little trouble identifying cases brought
solely on account of the race of the respondent, and dismisses those
cases. The immigration judges—or at least the two surveyed in this
piece—apply the Fourth Amendment and seem to extend their inquiries
to the Fifth Amendment as well because, as Judge Shapiro noted, “[t]he
circumstances surrounding an arrest or seizure of evidence may in some
instances render evidence inadmissible because it would violate the Fifth
Amendment’s requirement of fundamental fairness.”139
V. IS THE STRICT INTERPRETATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN
IMMIGRATION HEARINGS “CRACKED”140 BEYOND REPAIR?
Predictability and uniformity in judicial decisions are fundamental to
due process.141 The Fourth Amendment’s proscription against introducing

135. Id. at *3.
136. Id. at *4.
137. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 287.12 & Navarro-Chalan, 359 F.3d at 23 (requiring
regulations to have a purpose to benefit respondents in order for violations to require
dismissal).
138. Id. at *10 (citing Navia–Duran v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 568 F.2d
808-09 (1st Cir. 1977).
139. Id. at *5.
140. See LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 5 (reference to the term “cracks”).
141. See, e.g., Francis v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 532 F.2d 268, 273
(2nd Cir. 1976) (“Fundamental fairness dictates that permanent resident aliens who are in like
circumstances, but for irrelevant and fortuitous factors, be treated in a like manner.”).
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evidence gathered owing to breaches of fundamental rights is a touchstone
of our constitutional society. Yet on this issue, the federal circuit courts
of appeals, courts so central to the successful functioning of our judiciary,
not only suffer conceptual differences, but also tolerate among them
statistically-significant discrepancies in reversal or remand rates of BIA
cases.142 These disparities demonstrate a broken system, and mandate that
the jurisprudence surrounding the Fourth Amendment in immigration cases
be repaired.
A recent study of the federal circuit courts on a different issue—whether
they have jurisdiction to stay a grant of voluntary departure143 pending
judicial review144—found significant discrepancies. The authors concluded
that distinctions among the circuits,145 and the unpredictability resulting
therefrom, run counter to the “longstanding goal of uniformity within
national immigration policy.”146 The need for uniformity in this arena was
even stressed by Alexander Hamilton when he argued in The Federalist
Papers that “the power over naturalization must ‘necessarily be exclusive;

142. See Grant, supra note 90, at 956–57 n.198 (surveying reversal and affirmance
rates for nine circuits, from information available in December 2009 and based on the
last 136 court decision on the merits involving petitions for rev of BIA decisions of both
published and unpublished cases. The average affirmance rate for the eight circuits reviewed
is 89%., yet the discrepancy in rates of affirmance and accordingly in rates of remand or
reversal among the circuits surveyed varied from 63% to 99%, a significant difference.
The breakdown by circuits reveals the following affirmance rates: 1st Circuit, 90%; 2nd
Circuit, an 84%; in the 3rd Circuit, 84%; 4th Circuit, 97%; 5th Circuit, 93%; 6th Circuit,
82%; 7th Circuit, 63%; 9th Circuit, 80%; and in the 11th Circuit, 99%.).
143. Voluntary departure allows a respondent in a removal hearing to pay his/her
own way back home, avoiding many of the adverse effects of removal.
144. See Grant, supra note 90.
145. This question of circuit splits has become a more significant issue since the 1996
passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, or
“IIRAIRA.” Since this enactment, there has been considerable confusion among the
circuit courts when interpreting various vague sections of the law. One such example arises
in the effect of differing states’ classification of crimes; under IIRAIRA convictions of
certain crimes prevent a grant of voluntary departure. Many of the crimes in question are
defined at the state level. The circuit courts have had difficulty setting uniform parameters as
to which state crimes, under IIRAIRA, forestall voluntary departure grants and, accordingly,
as to the precise extent of their jurisdiction to review such grants. See Nicole Abruzzo,
Voluntary Departure Post-Iiraira: A Struggle Between Equitable Considerations Promoting
Clemency Measures, and Statutory Considerations Tending Towards Oppression, 21 ST.
JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 881, 883 (2007).
146. Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 311-12 (3rd Cir. 2002) (noting that the
Constitution and notions of “fundamental fairness” support the policy of uniformity in
the immigration context); see also Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 913 (9th
Cir. 2004).
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because if each State had power to prescribe a Distinct Rule there could
be no Uniform Rule.’”147
Courts have expressed concern about this type of disparate treatment,
particularly as it relates to “similarly situated aliens under the immigration
laws.”148 In Gerbier v. Holmes, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
emphasized the need for uniformity in immigration law, noting its concern
that those “convicted of drug offenses in different states . . . would be
treated differently with respect to deportation and cancellation of
removal . . . This cannot be what Congress intended in establishing a
“uniform” immigration law.”149
The Supreme Court is also inclined to favor uniformity in instances in
which varying state definitions of what constitutes criminal conduct have
federal sentencing consequences,150 in one case rejecting, on this basis,
the Eighth Circuit’s approach to the issue and mentioning its concern
about the possibility of unequal punishments for identical criminal
conduct.151
The adverse consequences of these discrepant federal circuit court
decisions, in the Fourth Amendment cases as well as in other issues,
extend beyond the theoretical: they adversely affect attorney–client
relationships, interfering with the immigration attorney’s ability to provide
effective legal representation. For example, clients can feel pressure
to move from one jurisdiction to another in an effort to find a circuit
court forum that will enhance their chances of success in immigration
court.152
“[I]nterpretations of the federal immigration statute vary greatly from
district to district and from circuit to circuit. These days, to effectively
represent his or her client, the successful immigration practitioner must
be well-versed not only in the law that applies in his or her backyard, but
also the law as applied across the country from sea to shining sea.”153
For example, a client applying for naturalization needs to establish good
moral character, but a conviction for certain crimes in some circuits
147. Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d at 311 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 at 181,
182 (Alexander Hamilton)); See Jeff Yates, Todd A. Collins & Gabriel J. Chin, A War
on Drugs or a War on Immigrants? Expanding the Definition of “Drug Trafficking” in
Determining Aggravated Felon Status for Noncitizens, 64 MD. L. REV. 875, 904-05 (2005).
148. Aguirre v. United States, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996).
149. Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d at 312.
150. Yates et al., supra note 147, at 905-06.
151. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590-91 (1990); see also Yates et al.,
supra note 148, at 906.
152. Jeff Joseph, Mary Holper & Gerald Seipp, The Importance of Finding the “Right”
Circuit for Your Immigration Case, 09-04 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (Apr. 2009).
153. Id.
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would prevent such a finding while in others it would not; thus, in some
cases, clients would be well-served by moving to a different circuit.154
That lawyers must advise clients to actually engage in a physical move
to a different jurisdiction underscores the grim situation in which we
find ourselves, whereby it is claimed that we operate within a federal
system, yet, in an area of such national importance as the enforcement of
our immigration laws, we hardly do.
VI. CONCLUSION
Of the four federal circuit courts of appeals that have spoken recently
concerning the exclusion issue in immigration courts—the First, Second,
Eighth, and Ninth—only one, the First Circuit, imposes a standard that
truly reflects adherence to Lopez-Mendoza’s requirement for egregious
behavior—misconduct by threats, coercion, or physical abuse —to exclude
evidence.155 The remaining circuits have essentially ignored, or perhaps
discarded, the Supreme Court’s prescription as they ruled, serially, that,
for evidence offered in removal hearings to be excluded as violating the
Fourth Amendment,
it must be established either that (a) “an egregious violation that was fundamentally
unfair had occurred or (b) that the violation—regardless of its egregiousness or
unfairness—undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.”156 In addition,
this Circuit reiterated that where the reliability of evidence is in dispute, even if the
conduct was not egregious, exclusion is warranted.157 (Second Circuit)158
it must be established that there was a custodial detention without justification
that “offends” the Fourth Amendment159 (Eighth Circuit); and, finally, that
it was obtained either as the result of a deliberate violation of the Fourth Amendment
or as the result of conduct that a reasonable officer should have known violated
the Constitution.160 (Ninth Circuit)

154. Id.
155. Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2006).
156. Singh v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207, 215 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Pinto-Montoya v.
Mukasey, 540 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d
231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006))).
157. Id. (citing Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 235).
158. See Singh, 553 F.3d at 207.
159. United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 422 F.3d 711, 712 (8th Cir. 2005).
160. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 .3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Adamson
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 745 F.2d 541, 545 (9th Cir. 1984)); see Orhorhaghe v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 38 F.3d 488 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming the Immigration
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None of these statements reflects Lopez-Mendoza’s ruling on the Fourth
Amendment. Rather, each seems to ignore that rule and to be applying,
actually, traditional Fourth Amendment principles. In fact, these rulings
essentially reflect the exclusionary rule long in place in non-immigration
or criminal cases.
While there appears, then, to be some consistency, at least among
three of the eleven federal circuits, this consistency does not address the
lack of uniformity among the rest of the courts. Nor does it establish
reliability at the BIA, which generally applies the law of the circuit in
which the case arose. “Thus, the law applied by the BIA differs by federal
circuit, where there is a split between the circuits, or where a particular
issue has been decided in one circuit but not another.”161 Different rules
should not apply when such a vital right is at stake, where the protection
accorded is based on the fortuity of the location in which an immigration
case is heard. If immigration rules are so central to protecting the
sovereignty of our nation,162 as the Supreme Court has been professing
for over one hundred years, interpretation of those rules should not depend
on the fortuitousness of the jurisdiction in which a case is heard.163
The Supreme Court is unlikely to accept certiorari on this issue, given
its low rate of acceptance and the limited scope of the cases it does hear,
particularly in the area of immigration.164 Hence, resolution of this
unsettling issue, though important, seems left to the federal circuit courts;
otherwise, if the distinctions would persist, lack of both respect for and
deference to the courts is the likely outcome.165

Judge’s suppression of passport and Form I-94 seized in an egregious violation of
constitutional rights involving both a race-based stop and invasive search techniques).
161. Paul O’Dwyer, A Well-Founded Fear Of Having My Sexual Orientation Asylum
Claim Heard In The Wrong Court, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 185, 193 (2007-2008).
162. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case) 130 U.S. 581,
610-11 (1889); see also Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
163. While it is true that discrepancies among the circuit courts of appeals are
tolerated on other issues, in this situation, because it is fundamental to the provision of
due process, it should not be. An expansive study of the reasons why this issue is some
much more fundamental than are others involving circuit differences and therefore
should not be permitted is beyond the scope of this article.
164. The immigration cases it has accepted in the past decade dealt with issues so
different from this one, which can be characterized as a micro-issue of how to conduct
immigration hearings, it is doubtful the Court would accept certiorari on this issue. The
cases they accepted concerned indefinite detention, Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001),
and pre-trial detention, Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
165. See Michele Benedetto, Crisis on The Immigration Bench, 73 BROOK L. REV.
467 (2008) (arguing that inconsistencies in grant rates for decisions among immigration
courts reflects a lack of judicial ethics).
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The recent blending of criminal and immigration law166 resulting from
IIRAIRA and its progeny167 enhances the argument that the exclusionary
rule’s application in the criminal and immigration courts must be unified. It
is wrong, unjust, and I suggest unconstitutional for the same evidence to
be inadmissible in one court of the United States and not in another. The
old adage that immigration matters are simply civil ones because
removal is a civil remedy no longer stands. This is true not only because
deportation is truly punishment and is essentially a criminal remedy,168
but also because of the numerous immigration law violations that had
been just but are now crimes; 169 the criminalization of immigration
law violators is well under way.170
The need to unify treatment of the Fourth Amendment between the
criminal and immigration courts raises the question as to what should
replace the Lopez-Mendoza test.171 Abandoning the Lopez-Mendoza
proscription against Fourth Amendment application in removal hearings
is insufficient. It is not acceptable to say that the rule is both morally
wrong and also unconstitutional without offering a workable alternative
that is likely to be effective and to avoid causing novel problems. In
searching for a remedy, one can find solutions by studying adjustments
made in other fields of law as their jurisprudence has developed. For
example, illustrations from the field of Tort law can shed light on

166. One might more accurately characterize it as “confusion between” the two areas of
law.
167. See supra discussion accompanying note 13.
168. I do consider it to be that; in fact it has been established that the consequences
are often worse for one removed than for one convicted of a crime. One convicted
spends some time in a United States prison, with all the protections that go along with that—
law libraries, exercise, medical care, even education. However, deportation is banishment.
This proposition was set out by Justice Brewer in his dissent in Fong Yue Ting. Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (“[i]f a banishment of this sort be not a
punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a
doom to which the name can be applied.”). For other relevant cases discussing the punitive
nature of deportation, see Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 176 (1923) and Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). For further discussion, see Robert Pauw, A New Look At
Deportation as Punishment: Why At Least Some of The Constitution’s Criminal Procedure
Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305 (2000).
169. One such example is illegal reentry following deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)
(9)(A) (2006).
170. See Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, And Sovereign Power,
supra note 13.
171. With the turmoil of tests that have been documented in this article, it is difficult to
say seriously that there really is not any Lopez-Mendoza test in any event.
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possible solutions. In recent years, many states have eliminated parent–
child immunity as well as the distinctions in the degree of care owed to
those injured on private land. States eliminating parent–child immunity
have generally replaced long-standing special rules with a general duty
to avoid being negligent. States eliminating the distinctions in the degree of
care owed to those injured on one’s land, which had been based on rigid
classifications of trespasser, licensee, or invitee, have also substituted a
negligence standard of care in its stead.
In like manner, we should replace Lopez-Mendoza’s archaic principle
of non-applicability of the Fourth Amendment in removal hearings with
a general, well-settled constitutional principle—that evidence gathered
as a result of violations of the Fourth Amendment must be suppressed.
The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have already
demonstrated to the remainder of the circuits, and to the BIA, how they
have dealt with the question and have offered their own sensible solution;
they have essentially interposed their own “general negligence standard,”
the standard of traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
It should suffice when an immigration respondent proves that
government agents violated constitutional rights in the gathering of
evidence to support the case. One should not have to prove that these
rights were violated egregiously, by misconduct, by threats, by coercion,
by physical abuse, by a deliberate violation of the Constitution, or as the
result of conduct that a government agent should have known violated
the Constitution. A violation of constitutional rights is a violation of
constitutional rights, and when it comes to violations generating evidence to
be introduced in the all-important removal hearing, that evidence is
tainted, ab initio, should be treated as such, and should be excluded.
Author’s Note: Immigration law, being progressive in nature, it is not
surprising that the argument made herein is taking hold. Since this
article was drafted, additional Immigration Courts have ruled that
Fourth Amendment rights were violated during unreasonable searches,
and judges have suppressed the evidence gathered as a result (see the
mid-Atlantic region). Readers can look forward to further progress on
this issue in the near future, including rulings from the BIA.
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